Over forty years ago, Daniel Bell made the provocative claim that ideological polarization was diminishing in Western democracies, but new ideologies were emerging and driving politics in developing nations. This article tests the End of Ideology thesis with a new wave of data from the World Values Survey (WVS) that covers over 70 nations representing more than 80 percent of the world's population. We find that polarization along the Left/Right dimension is substantially greater in the less affluent and less democratic societies than in advanced industrial democracies. The correlates of Left/Right orientations also vary systematically across regions. The twin pillars of economic and religious cleavages remain important in European states; cultural values and nationalism provide stronger bases of ideology in Asia and the Middle East. As Bell suggested, social modernization does seem to transform the extent and bases of ideological polarization within contemporary societies.
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Over forty years ago, Daniel Bell made the provocative claim that ideological polarization was diminishing in Western democracies, but new ideologies were emerging and driving politics in developing nations. This article tests the End of Ideology thesis with a new wave of data from the World Values Survey (WVS) that covers over 70 nations representing more than 80 percent of the world's population. We find that polarization along the Left/Right dimension is substantially greater in the less affluent and less democratic societies than in advanced industrial democracies. The correlates of Left/Right orientations also vary systematically across regions. The twin pillars of economic and religious cleavages remain important in European states; cultural values and nationalism provide stronger bases of ideology in Asia and the Middle East. As Bell suggested, social modernization does seem to transform the extent and bases of ideological polarization within contemporary societies.
Social Modernization and the End of Ideology Debate: Patterns of Ideological Polarization
In the halcyon days of the early 1960s, Daniel Bell (1960) made a provocative claim about the "End of Ideology. Bell maintained that "In the Western world, therefore, there is a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare
State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended" (pg. 373). He also claimed that while ideological debates had been exhausted in the West, new ideologies were emerging and driving politics in Asia and Africa.
For more than a generation, the basic premise underlying Bell's claim has been widely debate. The apparent erosion of the class cleavage in Western democracies, and the emergence of a consensus in support of the welfare state were taken as indicators of the erosion of traditional ideological divisions (Kirchheimer 1966; Thomas 1979) . By the 1990s, Mark Franklin and his colleagues (1992) argued that social group differences in voting patterns had sharply narrowed in Western democracies because these nations had successfully addressed the social divisions underlying these cleavages. Ideology had ended!
As the old cleavages apparently waned, however, new forms of political cleavage emerged in the advanced industrial democracies. This created a new debate over whether ideology was ending, or merely shifting the content of ideological competition. Most notably, Ronald Inglehart (1977 , 1990 and others have argued that new types of postmaterial issues were repolarizing Western publics, stimulating new conflicts over environmental quality, gender equality, and life style choices. The rise of Green parties and other social movements injected new ideological debates in the politics of advanced industrial democracies. More recently, a New Right reaction to these issues has further polarized contemporary politics.
This debate has largely focused on Bell's claim about the End of Ideology in the West, but not his comparison between the developed and developing world. In fact, there has been little systematic research on how social modernization may have affected the bases of ideological cleavage as Bell suggested. Our paper takes a broad international view of the End of Ideology debate. The End of Ideology thesis argues that ideological differences will moderate as nations experience social modernization. This occurs because increasing affluence provides the resources to address some of the most pressing social needs that have long been a primary goal of government: providing economic sustenance and security. In addition, the increasing complexity of a developed industrial society leads to a more differentiated social structure, more complex patterns of social and economic relations, and more interactions between members of the polity.
Black/white political differences might become muted into shades of grey by the complex structure of modern societies and cross-cutting interests. Indeed, this was implicit in much of the literature on the impact of modernization on political conflict.
We test the End of Ideology and Postmaterial hypotheses with a new wave of data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The fourth wave of the WVS includes an
unprecedented set of nations spanning the six inhabited continents and representing the diverse cultural, political and economic variations across nations. Over 70 nations are available for analysis, and unequaled resource in the social sciences.
We develop our analyses in several steps. First, we discuss the argument and logic underlying the End of Ideology hypothesis, and the rival Postmaterial hypothesis.
Second, we use cross-national aggregate data to test the core hypothesis of whether ideological positions are less polarized in advanced industrial democracies, while continuing to divide the publics in the developing world. Third, we examine the whether the correlates of ideology--and hence the meaning of ideological cleavage--vary systematically across nations. These empirical findings provide the basis for discussing the relationship between social modernization and ideology, and the likely consequences of this relationship for contemporary political systems.
The End of Ideology Thesis
Daniel Bell premised the End of Ideology Hypothesis on a set of social changes that were transforming Western democracies. One factor was the tremendous economic progress of the mid-20 th century, and the concomitant transformation of the employment patterns and living conditions. In a later work, Bell (1973) articulated this position in more detail, forecasting the emergence of post-industrial societies as the end-product of this transformation. The development of the welfare state, expanding employment in the tertiary sector, increasing geographic and social mobility all contributed to the blurring of traditional ideological divisions. Similarly, scholars such as Lane (1965) and (Beer 1978) discussed how the "age of affluence" would lessen attention to the economic controversies of the past and lead to a new period of political consensus.
A second element of Bell's (1960) thesis was that modern societies were steadily becoming more secular. This trend was lessening the moral content of political debate. In addition, he argued that political ideologies had traditionally had to compete with religion for public support. As religious attachments moderated, so also could the emotional attachments to a political position. Religion remains an important element in many Western democracies, but its influence has waned as a consequence of social modernization (Norris and Inglehart 2004) .
Moreover, in contrast to the West, Bell held that ideology continued to be a driving political force in developing nations. He concluded that "the extraordinary fact is that while the old nineteenth-century ideologies and intellectual debates have become exhausted [in the West], the rising states of Asia and Africa are fashioning new ideologies with a different appeal for their own people" (Bell 1960: 373) . 1 He emphasized the importance of nationalism, ethnicity, Pan-Arabism, and other ideological conflicts in the developing world. In a recent update to his initial book, Bell (2000) stressed the role of ethnicity and nationalism as source of division in developing nations.
At the same time, one might add that the struggles over economic well-being and individual rights still existed in the developing world, even if advanced industrial democracies had made substantial progress in addressing these concerns.
In contrast, the Postmaterial Hypothesis challenged the accuracy of the End of
Ideology thesis as applied to advanced industrial societies. Ronald Inglehart (1977 , 1984 , 1990 agreed that the traditional bases of ideological cleavage were eroding, especially visible in the class cleavage and the economic values underlying this framework.
Inglehart explicitly stated that there was a withering away of Marxian politics (1990: ch. 9 ). In Marx's place, however, new political controversies over life style issues, quality of life, and self-expression were emerging in postindustrial societies. This directly led to research on the changing content of "Left" and "Right" in these societies (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Inglehart 1984; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989; Knutsen 1995; Evans et al. 1996 (Inglehart 1984; Evans et al. 1996) . In summary, the Postmaterial hypothesis holds that ideology did not end, but the content of ideology changed with social modernization.
A second critique of the End of Ideology hypothesis involves Bell's assumptions about the developing world. He wrote at a time when decolonialization and national independence movements were transforming the Third World. During this period, nationalism and independence were powerful symbols in these nations. Furthermore, the political ideologies of these regimes were often portrayed in stark terms because the superpowers used the developing world as a surrogate for direct competition. Thus, political elites often stressed communist or Western orientations. However, it was less clear whether these geopolitical choices motivated the thinking of the populace. And with the end of the Cold War, this polarization also quickly dissipated. Research also implied that these publics have limited ideological orientations and be relatively unengaged in politics (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965) . The limited empirical research on ideological orientations among Third World publics has not resolved these contrasting images (e.g., Nathan and Shi 1996; Mainwaring 1999; Shin and Jhee 2004) .
In short, the nature and content of ideological attachments among publics in the developing world is imprecisely understood.
We examine these rival theories using the data from the newest wave of the 
Measuring Ideological Position
Political scientists may disagree on the content and nature of ideological competition, but there is general agreement that some ideological framework or core political identity is used to organize political discourse in a nation and the individual belief systems of the citizens. Typically, such broad orientations are described in terms of Left/Right attitudes (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989; Barnes 1997 In some nations, the political discourse is different, and so alternate wording is used for the endpoints of the scale. 3 We are less concerned with the labeling of the scale's poles, as long as these labels reflect the shorthand of political polarization in the nation. When there were deviations, the national teams made these decisions to produce maximum comparability to the theoretical construct. We will use the term "Left/Right" as a shorthand for this scale in the World Values Survey, although we recognize the exact terminology for this scale may vary in some nations.
This operationalization of ideology is certainly different from the more rigorous meaning embedded in Bell's writings. Mass publics typically lack the type of strict ideological reasoning that exists among political elites and intellectuals. Instead, we are tapping a framework of political thinking that is closer to Anthony Downs ' (1957) conceptualization of Left/Right as a cognitive framework for orienting political debate and mass beliefs.
Some indication of the basic validity of such orientations comes from the large majorities of the public who can position themselves of this scale (see Table 1 Table 1 goes about here = = =
Cross-national Comparisons of Ideological Polarization
The essence of the End of Ideology hypothesis is that social modernization moderates ideological polarization, providing a more centrist and moderate political debate. The tensions in advanced industrial societies are not between survival and starvation or between opposing moral absolutes, but between more modest differences in political means and ends. Thus, the most direct test of the hypothesis is to see if ideological polarization moderates with social and political development. 
Social Modernization and the Content of Ideology
The second element of the End of Ideology debate involves the potential shift in the content of ideology because of social modernization. Inglehart's Postmaterial thesis holds social modernization addresses many of the basic economic and sustenance needs that traditionally have been the major policy goals of citizens and their governments. In
European political systems, these needs were typically expressed in Marxian class-based issues such as the nationalization of industry, redistribution of income, and the government's role in the economy. However, as these goals were addressed, public and eventually government attention shifted attention toward a new set of postmaterial goals.
Issues such as environmental protection, social equality, self-expression and life style choices typified this new postmaterial issue agenda. He demonstrated this pattern with data from Western Europe, which showed that Left/Right identities were a mix of traditional economic issues and postmaterial issues (Inglehart 1990: ch. 9 ). Moreover, the connection between Left/Right ideology and postmaterial issues was substantially stronger among the young, suggesting a generational shift in ideological orientations was occurring.
As we have noted above, the empirical evidence on the content of Left/Right orientations in developing nations is quite limited. In many of these nations we find that a high percentage of the public is able to place themselves on this scale. Our next task is to determine the content of these orientations by examining the correlates of Left and Right.
The World Values Survey includes three sets of issues that are broadly discussed in the literature on ideology. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves
We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort Some of these issues are linked to socialist debate about the relationship between government and the economy. Other questions focus on issues of inequality and individual responsibility that may have equal relevance in developing nations.
Postmaterial Orientations. Inglehart's (1977 Inglehart's ( , 1999 Because economic and political development tend to be strongly related, and we have a large number of nations, we group nations into six broad cultural regions to provide the broad perspective encapsulated in the End of Ideology debate. We identify six regions with common characteristics: advanced industrial democracies, the postcommunist nations of East Europe, Latin American nations, Asian democracies, Middle
Eastern nations, and a diverse set of African nations.
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Economic Orientations
We first analyze the relationship between economic orientations and Left/Right self- Table 2 goes about here = = = Economic polarization along the Left/Right scale is strongest in the advanced industrial democracies. On the one hand, these controversies have been institutionalized in the structure of the party system and elite competition for more than a century, and this persisting importance is still apparent. Europe was, after all, the birthplace of Marxism, socialism and the ideological movements that generated the traditional meaning of Left.
On the other hand, longitudinal evidence and generational comparisons suggest that economic controversies are moderating in Europe. 9 A generation ago, economic polarization in Western Europe probably was even sharper.
Economic polarization also is a significant basis of political cleavage in East
Europe. Certainly East Europeans were familiar with this ideological debate, since it was embedded in the communist political order. But this cleavage was blurred under the old regimes, since there was no ideological competition between alternative positions. The communist class structure also transformed the traditional class alignment; despite the claim that the regime represented the working class, the intelligentsia and middle class held a privileged status. However, after the transition to democracy, the traditional Left/Right economic alignment is emerging in East European party systems and is only slightly weaker than in the West (Kitschelt et al. 1999 
Postmaterial Orientations
Our theoretical expectation for postmaterial issues is quite clear. Since these issues supposedly enter the political agenda once socio-economic development addresses traditional economic and security concerns, postmaterial issues should be a significant source of ideological orientations only in advanced industrial democracies. Inglehart's (1977 Inglehart's ( , 1990 analyses of postmaterial values support such a prediction.
The second panel of Table 2 One explanation for this apparent anomaly is that postmaterialism is related to broader value differences linked to modernization, which Inglehart and Welzel (2005) describe as the shift from survival to self-expressive values. These concerns are relevant beyond just advanced industrial democracies, and we might expect that survival concerns are even more salient in less affluent nations. To illustrate this broader relationship, the second row in this set of variables presents the relationship for self-expressive values. At the same time, it appears that historical conditions have created different linkages between these value orientations and Left/Right ideological labels. 2003) . Perhaps the greatest formal equality for women was achieved in Eastern Europe, and here gender role has the weakest link to ideological orientations.
In summary, these examples of postmaterial issues yield ambiguous regional patterns. As postmaterial issues, their impact should be strongest in advanced industrial democracies, where their impact is actually quite modest. 14 Instead, these issues have a stronger impact in developing nations where questions of material well-being and gender roles are salient to many citizens. It may be that these issues are more visible in advanced industrial democracies, because in these nations the two sides are relatively balanced.
However, where differences in opinion exist in these other regions, it serves as a basis of polarization. The other anomaly is Eastern Europe. The communist heritage of these nations has apparently created a different Left/Right alignment on these issues, with the Left becoming the advocate for materialist interests. The semantics of Left and Right have different meanings to post-communist electorates, and these meanings also likely vary across nations within the region (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 282-288) .
Other Orientations
Bell suggested that factors such as decolonialization, nation-building, religion and The last panel of These findings suggest that citizens in developing nations are more likely to orient themselves to politics in terms of religion or national identity issues, which generally outweigh economic issues as a basis of Left/Right identity. We suspect that ethnicity may also play a greater role in shaping political identities in developing nations (Elkins and Sides 2004; Bell 2000) . The different bases of political identities in developing nations can also explain why politics may become so divisive and polarizing. While policy differences over economics or even environmental quality are more susceptible to compromise, divisions over religion, regime and political community are more fundamental, almost inviolable to their adherents.
Combining Dimensions
One advantage of the Left/Right scale is that it provides a summary of the issues of contention in a political system. However, our analyses show that Left/Right orientations do not derive from a single source, but reflect multiple dimensions. Even in the broad regional patterns we have presented, both economic and cultural factors shape political identities, and the mix of dimensions reflects both the social development of the nation, and its cultural/political history.
Therefore, the last step in our analyses combines the several dimensions to examine their joint and independent influence in forming Left/Right orientations. We selected a subset of six items from Table 2 to avoid multicollinearity among items tapping a similar concept. We began with the item on government ownership of business to measure the classic socialist/capitalist divide. As we have shown, this continues to shape the identities of some citizens. We selected support for the environment to tap potential postmaterial concerns. Although the gender role scale was initially analyzed to measure postmaterial orientations, based on the patterns in Table 2 we included it as a measure of traditional values in many developing nations (and thus distinct from postmaterial concerns). Belief in the importance of God provides a measure of religiosity.
Support for democratic values is one element of political development that may be important in democratizing nations (e.g., Shin and Jhee 2004) . National pride provides an indicator of how nationalism may shape Left/Right orientations. We included all six predictors in an OLS regression model, including all nations within each cultural region in separate analyses (Table 3) . We consider these analyses as a preliminary attempt to map broad ideological orientations in terms of global regions, with the expectation that further research should probe these patterns on a nation-by-nation basis and with additional predictors. = = = Table 3 East European publics generally mirror the pattern among Western publics.
Economics and religion are the strongest correlates of Left/Attitudes in the East, albeit with significantly weaker coefficients in both instances. With our single cross-sectional survey we cannot tell whether the impact of these correlates is changing with democratization, and this is important in interpreting the present results. But indirect evidence suggests that ideological polarization is increasing along these cleavage lines. It is also significant that democratic values do not divide these publics. Immediately following the democratic transition, this may have been an important factor in structuring party competition and charting the institutional structure of the new system (Kitschelt et al. 1999 ). This division is no longer linked to Left/Right identities, however.
Consistent with our earlier analyses, people in developing nations are more likely to base their political identity on gender and religion. Gender and religion tap traditional value orientations based on the social patterns of pre-industrial societies. The importance of gender roles in shaping political identities in Latin America, the Middle East and East
Asian democracies is a striking example of the persistence of these value cleavages.
Orientations toward gender appear to tap feelings of equality between the sexes, as well as elements of tolerance and modernization that transcend the specific relationship between men and women (Inglehart and Norris 2003) . Religion also displays a significant 
Social Modernization and Ideology
Does social modernization transform the ideological basis of mass belief systems? Daniel Bell (1960 Bell ( , 1973 offered a broad theoretical model of how social modernization would affect mass beliefs. First, Bell presumed that the degree of ideological polarization was narrowing in advanced industrial societies. Second, he claimed that the sources of ideological polarization also changed as a consequence of modernization. We have used the unprecedented resources of the World Values Survey to empirically examine Bell's theory to an extent never before possible.
We have painted on a large canvas, and used broad brush strokes. Before discussing our findings and implications, we want to stress the need for more extensive and detailed analyses across individual nations and using different issue dimensions. We examined a broad theory of social change, analyzing patterns of Left/Right polarization across six regions of the globe. Some of the specific national patterns within these regions undoubtedly vary from the overall pattern, and these national differences can provide insights into how national histories structure the framework of political competition. 16 And it would be valuable to build upon our findings with other methodologies, such as open-ended inquiries into the meaning of "Left" and "Right."
Thus, our findings provide an outline of the impact of social modernization on ideology that can be refined with more detailed analyses.
We treat the Left/Right attitudes of mass publics as an indicator of the ideological orientations that Bell described. In large measure, the degree of ideological polarization fits Bell's predictions. Polarization along the Left/Right dimension is substantially greater in the less affluent and less democratic societies than in advanced industrial democracies.
Left and Right extremism reaches over 20 percent in the least developed nations, but averages only about 5 percent among the public in Western democracies.
The extent of political polarization is important because it can shape the political process of a nation. A long theoretical tradition holds that the centrifugal forces generated by polarization strain the political consensus (Sartori 1976: 131-173; Mainwaring 1999: 131-135 century of partisan competition on these two cleavages generated even sharper differences in the mid-20 th century, which remain apparent in our contemporary data. In other words, polarization was presumably even greater a generation ago (Kirchheimer 1966; Inglehart 1977 Inglehart , 1999 . In addition, environmental issues have their greatest weight in Western democracies, suggesting that this new basis of cleavage is developing within the advanced industrial democracies.
In contrast, Left/Right orientations in other regions are typically not linked to the economic issues that divide European publics. In our set of Asian democracies,
traditional social values (represented by attitudes toward gender roles) and political community (national pride) divide these publics. Thus, the social dimensions of class and religion that structure Western political systems are largely muted in the East, and postmaterial issues are also less salient.
Few among Arab publics express a Left/Right identity, since this nomenclature is not commonly used in political discourse. Where such Left/Right identities do exist, they are strongly related to attitudes toward gender roles. We see this as partially a reflection of the strong gender divide in Arab societies, as well as broader feelings of tolerance and acceptance of diversity that are tapped by the gender question (Inglehart and Norris 2004) . Finally, African publics appear to have diffuse Left/Right orientations, we with relationships with all the correlates we examined.
In his recent comment on the End of Ideology, Bell (2000) claims that ethnicity and linguistic cleavages are strengthening in the developing world, providing a new basis of division--even if these divisions are not fully expressed in a broader worldview or ideology. The differing bases of ideology may explain why developing societies are so polarized, because political orientations are shaped by deeply-seated questions of moral and national identity. This pattern also suggests that these divisions will be more difficult to manage than the economic competition in advanced industrial democracies.
This evidence on the correlates of ideological polarization is important at several levels. Ideological frameworks broadly define the content of politics and the nature of political competition. If politics is framed in terms of a socialist/capitalist or a nationalist ideology, this will influence the policy choices presented to the public and the nature of political discourse. The dominance of one ideological framework can also exclude other issues from the agenda, as when the New Deal debate in America excluded race from consideration. Or, when nationalism issues submerge discussions of class interests. Thus, the ideological structures we described are important in modeling processes of coalition formation, political representation, and electoral competition.
In summary, it is premature to argue that ideology is ending in any region of the globe. Citizens in affluent and less-affluent societies still rely on broad orientations such as Left/Right identities as heuristics for political action. But social modernization does transform the content of ideological polarization and the degree of this division. Indeed, one of the major underdiscussed consequences of social modernization may be this transformation of the ideological debate and all that this implies. .058 .277 (.065) .061
National pride .210 (.016) .081 .027 (.020) .011 .238 (.043) .056 .374 (.041) .129 .188 (.163) .034 .296 (.060) . A contrasting position questions whether publics in lower income and less developed nations were sufficiently engaged to have ideological orientations toward politics (Almond and Verba 1963; Mainwaring 1999: 131) . In these societies, politics might primarily involve elite competition, since many voters are politically unaware and do not develop an ideological position.
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Additional information on the nations included, survey methodology, questionnaires, and other technical points of the World Values Survey are available in Inglehart et al. (2004) or on the project's website: www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
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For instance, the U.S. survey used the terms "Liberal" and "Conservative"; the Japanese survey used "progressive" versus "conservative"; Vietnam used "continuing the reform" and "no reform." The question was not asked in the surveys in China, Singapore and Egypt. 4 For the less developed nations in our study, a contrasting explanation suggests the causal arrow might go in the opposite direction. That is, sharp polarization in a nation may hinder national development, thus retarding economic growth and democratization. 5 We excluded Vietnam and Tanzania because in both instances a large majority was positioned in one category, and thus we presumed this represents a nation-specific interpretation of this scale. At the same time, since these are both low income nations, their inclusion would only strengthen the pattern in Figure 1 . 6 The World Bank combined several indicators to "measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html). This index is strongly related to the combined percentage of Left and Right extremists in a nation (r=.68), which suggests that ideological polarization does weaken a regime.
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For the combined set of nations, these four items were strongly interrelated and formed a common dimension in a factor analysis. The factor loadings were: government ownership (.70), competition is good (.62), individual responsibility (.59), income inequality (.33).
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Not all nations listed in Table 1 are available on all the items we compare. Most categories are self-explanatory. The category of Asian democracies includes Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, India, the Philippines, and Turkey. For South Korea we use the 1999 data, even though there is not a separate missing data code to separate respondents not placing themselves on the scale. Turkey was included in this group to distinguish it from the non-democracies in the Middle East. Japan is included both among the advanced industrial democracies and among the Asian democracies because it reflects elements of both groups. There were a few remaining nondemocratic nations in Asia, but the number was too few to make regional generalizations. 10 One possibility is that the low coefficient occurs because we averaged quite different relationships across the ten Latin American surveys. We examined the government ownership question as one example. Only two of these ten nations match the average correlation for advanced industrial democracies, and most display a very weak relationship. Thus, it is the absence of a relationship, rather than conflicting relationships, which primarily produces the weak overall coefficient in Latin America (-.02).
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Because these are unstandardized regression coefficients, one can not directly compare the magnitude of effects across variables. The comparisons should focus on the same variable across regions. In judging the differences for the postmaterialism variables, the standard errors of these coefficients were in the .02-.04 range. Also see the multivariate analyses in Table 3 below.
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For the pooled set of East European nations, materialists were 9-10 percent more common on the far Right compared to the far Left, the opposite of the relationship in Western democracies.
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A notable exception to the pattern is the African nations, where environmental attitudes have a strong relationship (in the opposite direction to the Western democracies). We suspect this is because environmentalism is indirectly tapping economic issues because of the wording of the question. 14 We combined three variables--postmaterial values, environmentalism and gender equality--to predict Left/Right orientations within each region. The Multiple R in Western democracies is only half that of economic issues in these same nations. 15 We combined four questions on regime preferences, support for government by: a) strong leaders, b), experts, c), army rule, and d), support for democracy. We simply summed together responses to the four items (reversing the polarity of the democracy item) and divided the total by four. The resulting scale runs from 1) prefer non-democratic regimes and disapprove of democracy, to 4) prefer a democratic regime and disapprove of non-democratic regimes. 16 For instance, we found that both economic and religious issues were correlated with Left/Right orientations in Eastern Europe. In more detailed comparison of four Central European nations, Kitschelt et al. (1999: ch. 8) finds that religion has a strong impact in Poland, but weak effects in the other three nations. At the same time, economic issues are significant correlates of Left/Right in each nation.
